The Implications of Nepal's Identity Politics

In the media, we find that different ethnic minorities are demanding their own territories/benefits in Nepal. However, the ways they use to formulate and disseminate such demands should make us critical. The prevalent myth is that the lowly ethnic minor individual trusts in and relies upon mainstream politicians to take his/her protests to the forefront of Nepal's priorities. But there should be other routes towards political significance outside of direct use of established politicians. In short, the politics of difference is not a bottom-up phenomena here, and that (ethnic) difference is becoming an agenda in Nepal should signal that a new, more powerful political class is emerging, a political class which does not just observe and represent Nepal's problems and struggles, but a class which actively makes new borders between the ethnic minorities, which interprets/imagines between people a friction, an antagonism. And rather than read this political intervention as a form of maturity, one can easily say that the politicians' myth-making will eventually lead to Nepal's dependency on established political parties and politicians because of their role in defining the characteristics of Nepali identities. This dependency on the political sphere may eventually result in a paternal, all-providing, authoritarian party which tells the people who they really are. 

In Nepal, no longer is it necessary to formulate a difference from the foreign national, or rather, making an observation of one's difference from the foreign national is no longer a politically lucrative venture. Politics has diverted away from such grand claims and research of the international context to become more aware of and fixate upon the immediate surroundings: in political rhetoric, replacing the foreign national pulling the strings is the immediate, Nepali neighbor controlling some aspect of one's life, and this neighbor is not some abstract concept, but a 'politician's object,' that is, an object to be modified by politicians. (Also, party cadres multiply in number as the demand for Nepal to be known more accurately and administered more effectively increases.) The stark borders between two nations, which held so much sway in political uprisings, has given way to 'invisible borders' that often do not even separate, 'but are supposed to,' according to the politician and his/her cadres. The fight is not between two starkly different identities, but between identities which have intermingled, which continue to intermingle, between which difference is very hard to create and sustain. It seems the politicians have managed to create differences between such intermingling identities, showing a level of sophistication in their capacity to imagine/interpret Nepali society which was not present to such a degree before. What politicians are doing is truly historical in significance: they are intervening into the social sphere to create permanent borders between identities which had previously more 'naturally' converged, diverged, converged again and diverged again and so on.  

Identity politics, in the way in which it is being practiced, is making the political class more powerful, and one way we see this is the immediacy and availability of the politician to the Nepali social sphere now. Power does not entail being aloof from the base population, but the powerful are even more present to the population, even more directly involved, the more powerful they get. Lastly, this strong and ever present political class speaks of an authoritarian tendency, for the politician who is ever present, ever involved, supporting one ethnic minority over the other with a fervor, energy and passion that politicians did not have before, may lead to the birth of a leader who wishes to be an absolute authority. (It is quite important to note that the formation of an authoritative figure depends more on domestic identity-based relations and conflicts than international ones. Therefore, it may be true that those political parties and personalities that accuse the international community of injustice may not have authoritarian tendencies.) 

The Code of Nepal's Future Kingdoms

In Nepal, power relations have (temporarily) changed from what they were during the monarchy. Let us map the power relations during the time of the king with a set of lines perpendicular to one another, as shown in this figure:

The top most point in the vertical line in the figure above is occupied by the monarch. The only point where there is any sense of a power relation is in the point of intersection between the two lines, meaning that the place the subject to the king occupied was at the point of intersection of the two lines. A defined position was thus occupied by the subject, a position limited by a kind of unspoken law: the subject must be 'perpendicular' to the king. Only certain subjects occupied such a position, and the collection of all such privileged subject were considered a part of the kingdom (which implies that kingdoms have nothing to do with territorial expansion, but kingdoms are simply the territories that the king's subjects inhabit.) The mobility of the subjects in this kind of structure was from the edges of the horizontal line towards the point of intersection: everyone wanted a relationship with the king, and hence everyone attempted to move towards those sets of identity traits, behaviors, characteristics and practices which would be recognized by the king, which would be found among people who had a certain power relation with the king. The movement towards the set of things which a subject must do or occupy in order to be recognized by the king was the theme to this kind of power relation. Another theme was the violence shown to those who voluntarily or involuntarily did not move towards these recognized kinds of identities and practices. The violence shown by the powerful towards the kingdom's own non-conforming subjects are higher in this type of power structure.

Moving to the type of power relation that exists today, we may note the different way it can be imagined, as in the figure in the left. The contact between the top (the powerful) and the bottom of the pyramid is now at the edges of the horizontal line, rather than at a fixed point within it. There is no longer the need to conform to a narrow identity or practice, for power is not concentrated to a point in the base, but stretched across a line. A spread of identities and practices are in contact with power. There is a lessening of violence towards the subjects and a logic of inclusion pervades the territory.

Using Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the difference between the two power structures could be called a movement from “territorializing” power, which produces a body of rules or “codes” that allow a subject to come to a relationship with the king if the subject conforms to certain identity markers and cultural practices, to a “deterritorializing” power, where the subjects are not concerned about their obedience of the law regarding their identity, and where power itself becomes more accountable towards them and approaches them, at the borders, at the margins/edges. We are slowly moving to the point where the crafting of one's identity and the subscription to 'official'/state sanctioned cultural practice is not as important in the composition of society as it was under the figure of the king. In Deleuze and Guattari, coding and decoding come one after the other in a cycle, and so we may expect a kind of resurgence in the perpendicular relationship as evident in the strong focus on social mobility, the growing exclusivity of power, the resurgence in the official sanctioning of the right behavior, right culture and right identity, and the receding of the expansive, Foucauldian “science of government” for a careful and meticulous attention to the select few within the power relation. However, one should note that the decoded and deterritorialized power scheme of today is only a kind of image of the real thing, since it will also give way without resistance.  

The Poached Object: Differently Significant in Colonialism than in Nepal's Feudalism(s)

A rhinoceros' horn finds its way into human society, from the forest at Chitwan into a living-room, but it carries a different significance depending on whether it was the result of colonial poaching or of Nepali “feudal/monarchical” poaching. Nevertheless, poaching in general seems to have been derived from a kind of colonialist 'business model': trade-routes fraught with danger (violence is an integral part of the colonial business model) and production processes concerned with 'extraction' rather than value-addition...other examples of this 'colonialist' business model are the diamond trade, the illegal drug trade and the stealing of idols/statues of Gods, as all three of these trades seem to rely on the archaic model of capitalism espoused during colonialism. In poaching, the feudal elements in Nepal's history seem to have been inspired by this colonial business model, but the signs of feudal poaching carry a different meaning than the signs of colonial poaching, even though both colonialists and feudal elements may end up extracting the same product and finding the same place of exhibition of this product (the 'living room'). As long as poaching continues, therefore, we cannot say that we are out of colonialism if we espouse some of the same trade practices that we did back then. Poaching tells us we are in colonialism with a different name. 

It is tempting to think that the rhinoceros horn was a kind of fetish, but it was not. A fetish is an object which causes pleasure, it is a kind of addition to socializing which makes the experience of socializing pleasurable. However, borrowing from Lacan, we believe the rhinoceros horn is the object small 'a.' Deriving from the discussions of Lacanians regarding the object small 'a', we can say that the object small 'a' (henceforth, object a) is different from other types of capitalism's fetishized objects prevalent in society today, and so first of all we may begin by saying that the object a is an object produced first during colonial times and through colonial means and mechanisms, and not produced within the capitalist form of production as a readily consumable object. As opposed to the fetish, the object a or the poached object is the object which is supposed to enjoy rather than the subjects in its presence enjoying it. This character of being both enjoying and lifeless makes the poached object uncanny. In short, the poached object is not enjoyable but itself supposed to be enjoying. Perhaps we can say that the poached object was an enjoyable fetish for Nepalis, and the enjoyment/consumption of this object was a distraction with negative consequences, one of which is the fact that Nepali feudalism was not as efficient and respectful of its economy as colonialism was, eventually making Nepali society a society of consumers seeking fetishized products rather than producers concerned with efficiency. 

The colonial experience, where foreign men were geographically so far away from their homeland as to be anxious that they may no longer heed their authority figures, utilized the poached object as something which could serve as a metaphor for the authority figure. The rhinoceros horn was the master in the colonial experience, it re-presented directly the human figure of the master who was far away, and, more practically, it reminded the colonial officers of the abstract authority of the colonial mission of which they were a part. The colonialists in the foreign land, away from their master, desired another master, similar to when Lacan claimed that French students desired another master when they revolted against the existing order. This master in the colonial experience was the poached object, which is also a quite degrading fact since it implies that the colonialists never considered the actual native human beings who knew the land so well as their masters. It is precisely because of the metaphoric representation of authority that the poached object carried that it has become such a prized object today, that is, it is valuable as an authoritative object and for its legacy as an authoritative object. It similarly has value to academic institutions studying power because of the seamless way in which it has managed to integrate into human relations of authority and hierarchy. The object 'rules the world' in our contemporary capitalist moment, by re-presenting the authority figure, and being the most authoritative of things within human relations. What we mean is that it is not the object produced by capitalism for consumption (such as a car) which rules the world, but precisely the colonial-authoritative object, the object small a, which does so.

Exoticism and the Truth of Revolutionary Desire in Nepal and Tibet

How is it that Tibet is, on the one hand, mystical and exotic, while on the other hand being one of the most politically heated regions in the world? It seems that exoticism, when it comes to Tibet, is embroiled in a Foucauldian “technique of government,” where exoticism enables a certain management of the population, and more importantly, a regulation of the desire of the Western revolutionary who wishes to fight for a “Free Tibet.” Indeed, "making exotic" may be one of the first "techniques of government" employed by the West on territories like Tibet and Nepal, just in order to make political engagement in these territories a matter of mature and sophisticated political institutions rather than students in a university or college. The key point regarding Tibet, for Western power, is to maintain a kind of balance. The message from power is this: Tibet is in trouble, yes, but it can also be enjoyed. All it takes to enjoy Tibet is only a little effort, and a subscription to the myths of exotic Tibet. Also, it seems that in Tibet an enjoyable way of countering oppression is sought by Western powers, shaping the struggle there as a romantic struggle, but even more than romantic, an enjoyable struggle, a struggle enjoyable as long as it lasts, to the point where some Western revolutionary practices and organizations do not want it to end. ..and indeed the exotic and the revolutionary have fused into a common image when it comes to Tibet and Tibet-related movements. Another important development has been how the struggle has been watched, discussed and acted upon from a distance, as if Westerners have not considered that the struggle may require more direct actions, such as direct visits by students protesting about Tibet. There will be no "remote control revolution." 

To a lesser intensity, Nepal is similar to Tibet in its ability to inspire revolutionary desire, and this desire is here too stunted by exotic appeal, embodied in Nepal by the figure of the tourist. There is power being exercised upon Western foreigners as is evident from the fact that these people have to come to Nepal conforming to an image of a tourist; any other reasons for travel here are still considered dangerous, but in fact this image of a dangerous Nepal is a way to stunt the real potential of Nepal as a place inspiring a revolutionary spirit. Like Tibet, Nepal is both appealingly exotic and dangerous. The political problems of Nepal are considered confined within its national boundaries and there hasn't been the kind of exposure as is being received in Tibet, but Nepal has the same potential to inspire a particular kind of approach to politics which is represented by a subject invested with what we are calling here "revolutionary desire."  

What does this "revolutionary desire" look like? Perhaps we can come to it by witnessing its opposite, exoticism, in action. Whereas the “exotifying” person, the tourist, is not to present to and attentive of the realities of Nepal (being distanced as he is into an artistic-creative spirit focused on Nepal's natural and cultural objects and practices), the revolutionary subject is very attuned to the more humanistic, social realities, and becomes fully immersed in the everyday of Nepal. He/she becomes, in Deleuzian-Guattarian terms, “deterritorialized” as a subject, not belonging to any place or time, including his/her Western homeland and its myths. He/she has not destroyed his/her desire, but found in the place where revolution is ripe and certain, a home. The link between identity and politics is broken when it comes to revolutionary desire; it can emerge to fight on the side of justice anywhere...The sacrifice of one's feelings for one's home territory is precisely what concerns Western powers. They are content with exoticism of the other, but they do not want any kind of abandonment of the homeland by their own citizens that results when the exotic image is removed. What inspired a loyal relationship to one's homeland was a kind of distance maintained with the other, a distance created between West and East by the forces that "make exotic," and once this distance is gone, the result is a lack of belief in the idea of a homeland and a motivation/desire to work towards the struggles of people elsewhere.  

If Nepal fuels the (revolutionary) desire of foreigners, then Nepal is what in Lacan is called the “object small a,” also known as the "object-cause of desire." The object-cause is itself not the desired object, but rather, it is some kind of a elusive material which in the subject causes desire for something else. The exotic-seeker piles layers to shroud such an “object small a,” so there is spirituality, mystique, religion and culture, all of which are layers to prevent the potent political scenario of Nepal from influencing foreigners to the full. What is truthful is that the first thing one would notice about Nepal, if it were not for its identity as exotic, is its politics, meaning that any subject who traverses beyond the exotic comes to confront the political. A kind of comparative politics between Nepal and the West is made possible, eventually leading to a revolutionary desire through the realization of the injustice upon Nepal. Perhaps we can understand Lacan's crucial idea of "traversing the fantasy" as precisely traversing the exotic, going beyond the exotic, so that the contemporary world's political identities come to the fore. This consciousness of the politics all over the world will make the Western subject more fruitfully and actively engaged in the world rather than remain a passive tourist. Finally, we can begin to understand how the “objects small a,” such as Nepal and Tibet,  are also felt as “objects of anxiety” when they are approached, if we are to think that we are approaching them as a powerful subject, as a subject who does not want to see revolutionary desire develop. 

The Oncoming Psychotic Age in Globalizing Nepal

Nepal will soon enter a psychotic age as it globalizes, and as it enters a new phase of geopolitics. So far, Nepal, although exhibiting disorganization, does not exhibit signs of psychosis, such as collective delusions of grandeur, collective paranoia, a kind of disorganization/confusion in its interactions and relationships with other powers, and complete, self-destructive isolation. This has to do with a particular type of relation Nepal maintains with the outside world: this relation was confined to a relation with Western powers that were stronger, powers that in very real ways served as a paternal metaphor for weak nations. For instance, World Wars were fought between powerful nations only, as if to suggest that a paternal nation was protecting its child--its territory was considered its child. Also, colonial territories were considered the “sons and daughters” of the superpowers. 

In Lacanian terms, the subject's recognition of a paternal metaphor is what ultimately causes the subject to resist psychosis, meaning that as long as the subject recognizes a father figure, there is no psychosis. In psychosis, Lacanians consider that the “Name of the Father” is “foreclosed,” meaning that this ordering and organizing metaphoric "Name" of the father is unavailable to the psychotic subject. Without this authority, this strong name of the father, the psychotic does not enter the symbolic order at all and therefore exhibits the symptoms of psychosis.  

We are getting close, today in Nepal, to a situation where the paternal metaphor will be foreclosed for the generations to come, with the result being psychosis. The main reason for this foreclosure is that in globalization, Nepal is no longer seen as a “son or daughter” by the Western superpowers, but rather, it is seen as an equal, where it is genuinely expected that Nepal will significantly contribute to the global capitalist system. For instance, Information Technology firms may export work to Nepal, not only because hiring is cheap here, but also because they have seriously found work conditions to be similar to that of the West and a level of maturity in Nepali self-governance and self-management. Thus, Nepal will enter global capitalism as a contributor, as productive; not as a sheltered, protected territory, but as an active force in managing and creating global flows. Hence, the West will consider Nepal as a (sexual) partner, rather than as a muted child. A “sexual economy” will characterize Nepal's relationship with the West.

This sexual economy means precisely that the paternal function occupied by the Western superpower will now vanish, for in its place is the West as a “husband,” or, even more aptly for today's liberal times, a “boyfriend.” The paternal metaphor, so vital in maintaining order through authority, will give way to a figure who is far more liberal, but also volatile, prone to getting anxious and angry...in a sense the relationship between two immature equals will develop. And as soon as the paternal metaphor is absent from the picture, the end result will be a kind of (social) psychosis...paranoiac relations between social organizations and an overwhelming media commenting on every act of every individual could be some of the things that will structure Nepali society in its psychotic age.

From Nepal's side, Nepal's anti-authority radical left has been responsible in its movement towards the psychosis-inducing sexual economy model among its own subjects and for "Nepal" as a symbolic entity in geopolitics. The radical left is generally concerned with a “post-Oedipal” movement in subjects, and the desired goal for moving beyond the Oedipal conflict (“sex with parent”) is moving towards a sexual economy (“partnership with equal”). It may be that the radical left subscribe to the idea that psychosis is a kind of 'liberation' from the authority of the paternal-West, and their violence in Nepali space may be motivated by the explosive removal of objects that signify a paternal-Western order. Through the removal of the signs of a paternal-West, Nepali subjects of the future will not come to know paternal authority and thereby become psychotic. 

Even in being labeled "terrorists" by the West, the radical left has made progress: by being considered a “threat” instead of a nuisance or an irritation, the West is showing that Nepali political organizations are now to be dealt with as if they were more mature, and that they should be seen as adult rivals instead of as children. Lacan's famous formula that “there is no sexual relation” can be interpreted as meaning that there is no loving relation between the partners, but there is a kind of rivalry; the compatibility of love and sexual relation is a myth. But where the West seeks a balance between authority and liberal agendas through the "husband" function ("husband" suggesting both governmental authority and sexual liberation), the continuous destruction of paternal-Western objects in Nepali space will cause psychosis (including a very real increase in the number of psychotics) soon. This is indeed a threat to Nepal's very existence, its very name, as a symbolic, sovereign territory. Either it will break up (become disorganized) or it will be consumed, in either case, in the place of "Nepal" will be something else.