We know the much
discussed practice of financial industry figures joining the
government; indeed we can call certain functional positions within
the financial industry as “financial-governmental positions,”
because the sole design of these positions may be to enable the
figures in those positions to “go to government.” This move from
finance to government appears motivated by the wish to “serve the
people” that financial figures may feel after having served private
interests for so long. But in truth the financial industry does
not fragment once one of its members joins the government, rather, it
gets even stronger, for it now has one of its own inside government
and can influence the image and punishment of the financial industry.
The weakness of
government when dealing with the financial-governmental figure is
what can be called government's “confessional mode.” Whenever a
financial-governmental figure approaches it, the governmental
establishment swells with pride in anticipation of the admission of
guilt that will come about through a confessional conversation of wrongdoing (involving
greed.) The governmental establishment thinks that upon the admission
of guilt, the financial figure will be “purged of the sin of greed”
and will wholeheartedly work towards providing governmental service
to the people. At no time does the government consider that the
financial-governmental figure is a representative of the financial
industry, and therefore the government does not act against the
financial industry as a whole via a visible punishment, but acts only
to slightly amend the constitution in order that the particular governmental-financial figure may be stopped from committing another
sinful act.
The lack of strict
punishment as a whole may be even more aggravated when the
governmental establishment has figures who derive pleasure from the
confessional mode. When there is pleasure in hearing a confession,
there is no meaningful punishment of anyone in order that the
financial-governmental figures can continue to do wrong and therefore
continue to confess to government. We may turn to Foucault who
shows us how integral visibility of the punished figure is to confirm
effectively the role of punishment in society, but today there is no
visible, meaningful punishment besides the slight and technical
amendment of the constitution, which looks more of a symbolic gesture
than justified punishment to the citizens.
One
may say the willingness of financial figures to “go to government”
shows the openness of government these days, an openness which may
inspire the financial figures to share more and eventually work to
change the financial system as a whole. However the confessional mode
is shrouded in secrecy: we know from confession in churches where a
screen separates the figures when they discuss the sin, and similarly
in government, there are ways in which the confession is made vague
and opaque, when not all of the guilt is conveyed, when only that
much is said with which one oneself may continue to remain secret. In
all, this confessional mode within government is in crisis and this
is a serious problem, because even when the financial-governmental
figures feel guilty and admit this guilt they are not able to enact
meaningful change through the government, partly because the
government itself does not properly interpret and act on this guilt and its confession.