The Frequent Meetings Between Figures Involved In The Greek Crisis

In the Greek financial crisis, the 'powerful' figures of Greece and EU members have been meeting one another very frequently, and this indicates that power relations between the figures are being formed and challenged constantly. The Greek case is peculiar: we are quite accustomed to nations failing, but when they fail usually it is in cases such as civil wars, so that the government is lost before the nation fails in the usual case. It is in the Greek crisis where Greek and European governmental structures are alive, active and aware of the failures-in-progress, where governmental and financial structures are very present to the Greek failure, they are very sturdy, yet they are not acting in ways that can save the people from the crisis; it is a crisis given that there is plenty of power in each figure/structure rather than a failure caused by a lack of power everywhere, so it is a failure within and because of the power-play rather than after the exhaustion of power of all figures and parties involved.

In this crisis, even governing structures and not just banks deserve the label “too big to fail,” in that, so far it is governing structures being “saved” by financial institutions rather than governmental structures doing the saving. However, financial institutions seldom have the patience of saving government indefinitely, and so it is only in the eyes of a benevolent government that institutions and structures become “too big to fail” and are saved. It is not in the interest of financial institutions to constantly act as “saviors.” Only a big and benevolent governmental structure can save Greece for a period of decades and generations now.  

We also see in the meetings of the prominent figures of Greece, EU, ECB etc the surprising intimacy of governmental figures and financial figures. It is a case of financial figures looking into the politics of the crisis, and politicians looking into the financial aspects of it, as if each figure knows his/her own area of interest/expertise will not bring about the solution, and so these interminglings show desire among the figures involved to evoke a proper “EU philosophy” which would move beyond finance and governance, which would wipe the slate clean of political and financial attempts, so that the figures could meet and act in the name of that “EU philosophy” and undertake a more romantic/idealistic cause to save Greece. The optimistic signs are there that romanticism is already in play, because the figures in the crisis have become elevated personalities in the eyes of one another, with the media only working to add cosmetics to that elevation or “romance,” and this romantic attachment to changing one another is why they meet one another so frequently and in friendly terms. The figures of the “savior” and the “rebel” and several others are in play in this romance.

Yet the influential figures in the crisis simply do not know how to act without a properly important “EU philosophy” given that their financial and political decisions have failed, and subsequently the crisis is always worded in such complicated terms and unfolds in a complex manner, with these complications and complexities showing a desire to be articulate and productive in a philosophical manner. But the problem is that it is in the “style” of idealistic philosophy to arrive a little too late to the scene, and so we may see the figures involved evoking the philosophical underpinnings of the EU only once the EU has failed. Idealistic philosophy must be present to the crisis at the moment, not at a later time when the EU can be painted, appropriately for those figures involved who wish to remain in their seats, as a philosophical mistake rather than a governmental or financial one.